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GERALDINE SZOTT MOOHR*
On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime
INTRODUCTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND CORPORATE LAW HAVE TRADITIONALLY occupied different legal
spheres. Although important exceptions exist (public welfare offenses and regula-
tory crimes come to mind), the two fields historically developed along separate
tracks. The recent surge in corporate misconduct by executives has changed all that,
and it is no longer uncommon for the two tracks to intersect and even to overlap.
The disciplines now share common interests: The need to deter criminal miscon-
duct and to encourage law-abiding conduct at business firms.
Congress seems to have recognized this new overlap of corporate and criminal
law in drafting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which includes provisions regarding both
corporate governance and criminal law.' Congress strengthened the regulatory ap-
proach and also provided the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with
increased funding. Independently of Congress, the executive branch mounted an
unprecedented criminal enforcement effort that added personnel, created task
forces, and generally devoted significant resources to identifying and prosecuting
white collar crimes.2 Those combined efforts have resulted in, as of December 2005,
indictments of 314 individuals from fifty-two different corporations and convic-
tions of 161 individuals.3
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1. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). For a comprehensive summary of legislative and regulatory
initiatives, see Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
277, 281-306 (2004).
2. See John R. Wilke, President Praises Work of Task Force on Business Crime, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2002,
at A4 (reporting administration initiatives).
3. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Major Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, March 2002-December 2005 Ihereinafter
Brickey, Major Corporate Fraud Prosecutions] (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). A few individ-
uals were indicted more than once, for instance when state and federal prosecutors brought charges. Id. The
number of convictions includes guilty pleas and convictions after trial. Id. Professor Brickey has analyzed the
numbers from several perspectives and helpfully provides data in appendices to her articles. See, e.g., Kathleen
F. Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006) [hereinaf-
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The emphasis on criminal law by Congress and the executive branch is not inap-
propriate. Crimes were committed and serious offenses harmed investors, employ-
ees, and public confidence in the financial system. Yet it would be remiss to forget
that the crimes occurred in corporate settings, went undetected by gatekeepers and
by regulators charged with monitoring corporate finance, and involved the acquies-
cence, if not the complicity, of corporate boards. This essay considers the deterrent
force of the substantive white collar criminal statutes, their penalty schemes, and
current efforts to enforce those laws in the context of the formal and informal
complexities of an institutional setting.
I. "CORPORATE CRIME"
The term, "corporate crime," has two meanings, and to which meaning courts and
commentators refer is not always clear. "Corporate crime" may refer to the criminal
liability of the corporate entity. The term may also refer to the criminal conduct
and liability of an agent of the firm. Although the two meanings are related, it is
important to distinguish misconduct at the corporation from misconduct by the
corporation. Indeed, the firm is not always a perpetrator. A business firm may be a
victim of an agent's misconduct, and in some cases, may be both a victim and a
perpetrator.
The concept of corporate crime as committed by the entity does not occupy a
comfortable berth in corporate governance law. Nor does it occupy a natural place
in criminal law, reflecting as it does an inherent tension in criminal law theory.
Criminal theory teaches that punishment is justified only when one has chosen to
disobey the law. Despite exceptions like conspiracy, the general rule is that individ-
uals are responsible only for their own actions. Criminal liability is a function of
immorality of conduct and culpability of the actor, which includes an individual's
decision to flaunt community norms and disobey the law.
In contrast to a human being, a corporation-an unnatural, artificial person-
can act only through others. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there is no person
there. Thus, the justification for punishing a corporation does not rest on personal
choice. Instead, federal corporate criminal liability rests squarely on the concept of
vicarious liability.4 Indeed, the 1909 Supreme Court decision that established cor-
porate criminal liability was based on a beneficial consequence of punishing the
corporation-enhancing the government's ability to control and regulate corpora-
tions. The Court noted that punishing individuals was often ineffective in securing
ter In Enron's Wake]; Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003) [hereinafter From Enron to WorldCom].
4. State criminal laws may limit corporate criminal liability to acts that were authorized or tolerated by
the board or high managerial agents. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(c). This essay considers only the
federal approach to white collar and corporate crime.
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compliance with the law,5 and reasoned that absolving corporations of guilt "would
virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and
correcting the abuses aimed at."6 Although the court's reasoning is less than per-
suasive in our age of regulatory enforcement, for better or worse the federal stan-
dard for corporate criminal liability is the familiar respondeat superior of tort law.
The pragmatic basis for assigning guilt to a corporate entity is reflected in the
standard for determining when a business may be guilty of a crime. In the federal
system, a corporation bears responsibility for the crime of an agent when the agent
acted within the scope of his or her real or apparent authority, intending to benefit
the firm. The prospect of criminal liability gives firms an incentive to prevent crim-
inal conduct in the first place, and that incentive is quite strong because corporate
criminal responsibility in the federal system derives almost automatically from an
agent's conduct. The standards for determining when agents acted within the scope
of their authority and in the interest of the firm are not difficult to establish.7
In sum, a finding of corporate guilt derives from the crime of a natural person.
Corporate crime is a function of individual misconduct, and the ultimate target of
deterrence is the individual with the means and power to injure the public. It is
thus appropriate to consider the prospects for deterring agents who commit corpo-
rate crimes.
II. DETERRENCE FROM SUBSTANTIVE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL LAW
Recent events induce skepticism about the effectiveness of criminal law in control-
ling criminal conduct within corporations. The criminal laws that were "on the
books" failed to deter recent frauds in Enron and other firms, a puzzling circum-
stance that merits discussion The federal white collar statutes have long pro-
scribed a broad range of deceptive conduct, and courts treat prosecutorial
interpretations of these statutes with deference. Following a triggering event, like
issuing an earnings restatement, Department of Justice (DOJ) investigators could
rely on criminal statutes like obstructing justice and false statement to facilitate
investigation. In addition, a wide range of questionable business conduct could be
investigated by the SEC, which is dedicated to protecting investors, and referred to
the DOJ for further investigation and prosecution. Although criminal and civil en-
forcement efforts were certainly less intense in earlier days than they now are, busi-
ness pages routinely reported news of criminal convictions and corporate
5. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (stating that the law
"could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals only were subject to punishment" for violations).
6. Id. at 496.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), affd on other
grounds, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
8. 1 have discussed this and related points in an analysis of the government's response to the Enron
matter. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate
Crime, 55 FLA. L. REv. 937, 956-64 (2003) [hereinafter An Enron Lesson].
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settlements. Nor were criminal penalties insignificant. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have steadily increased the sentences of white collar offenders,9 and
prosecutors could enhance penalties by adding charges of money laundering and
racketeering.
The failure of substantive criminal law to deter the recent frauds is even more
striking when one takes into account the planning required for fraudulent schemes,
especially those involving accounting practices. Those contemplating questionable
conduct at Enron and other firms had time and means to consider the costs and
benefits of their actions. Moreover, white collar actors are positioned to care about
social status and are motivated to avoid the disgrace of involvement with the crimi-
nal justice system, much less the disgrace that accompanies investigation, indict-
ment, and conviction. Nevertheless, fraudulent conduct seems to have been
endemic at certain companies. Corporate law scholars have pointed to gaps in cor-
porate governance standards, auditors' conflicts of interest, and the creation of per-
verse incentives as explanations. Even so, why were criminal laws so ineffective?
A. The Nature of White Collar Criminal Laws
One explanation for the failure of criminal laws to deter misconduct at Enron and
other firms rests on the nature of substantive white collar crimes. The most rele-
vant white collar criminal laws, such as fraud offenses, articulate standards rather
than rules, and are aspirational in tone. They are written in open-ended language
that does not define crucial terms such as the elements of an offense.' Broadly-
written crimes like fraud and obstruction give prosecutors great flexibility because
the statutes can be applied to a wide range of conduct.
There is, nonetheless, a significant disadvantage to such breadth when the enun-
ciated standards of conduct and culpability are inherently unclear and/or ambigu-
ous." Broad, ambiguous terms do not clearly announce the conduct that is
9. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-15 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (summarizing white
collar punishment schemes under the Guidelines); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.l(a)(4)(d)
(2005) (explaining use of unique basis that increased sentences for white collar offenses); Id. § 2B1.l (providing
new methods of calculating financial loss for several white collar crimes). The changes, which provided a more
comprehensive definition of monetary loss, were made in 2001, before either the scandals came to light or the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed. See id. § 2B1.1, app. C Amend. 617. The Guidelines were again amended after
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley to reflect the increased maximum prison terms of existing crimes and the new
offenses. Id.
10. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2007) (mail and wire fraud prohibiting "a scheme to defraud"); see
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 77ff (securities fraud prohibiting "willful" employment of "any manipulative or deceptive
device"); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice prohibiting an "endeavor[ I to influence, obstruct, or impede,
the due administration of justice").
11. The breadth and vagueness of federal offenses became apparent when prosecutors began to use the
mail and wire fraud statutes to pursue state and local corruption following Watergate. See Charles F.C. Ruff,
Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 655 GEO. L.J.
1171 (1977). Expansive decisions sparked more criticism of the statute. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of
Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinc-
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prohibited. They fail to provide notice to the public and enforcement standards to
prosecutors, judges, and juries, as required by constitutional due process through
the void for vagueness doctrine. 2 The practical effects are that potential offenders
may not identify proposed conduct as giving rise to criminal liability, and juries do
not have an adequate standard against which to measure the defendant's conduct.
The culpability or mens rea elements of federal statutes is similarly problematic.
The federal code uses terms from the common law, rather than the concisely de-
fined culpability elements of the Model Penal Code. Terms like "corruptly" and
"willfully," do not have settled meanings, allowing courts to adapt the element to
the circumstances of the case at hand, instead of measuring the defendant's state of
mind against a clear standard. The consequences can be disastrous for defendants
and prosecutors, as the Arthur Andersen case illustrates. The firm was convicted
of "corruptly" obstructing justice as it was expansively defined (at prosecutors' urg-
ing) in the trial court's instruction to the jury. After the demise of the firm, its trial,
and appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the trial court's defini-
tion, reversing Andersen's conviction. 3
Ambiguous statutory language allows courts to define the substantive law as in-
cluding the conduct at issue-after the conduct took place. Judicial decisions find-
ing that a particular scheme violated the federal fraud provisions provide formal
notice to those contemplating similar conduct in the future.'4 But formal notice
recorded in judicial decisions and collected in reporters does nothing to prevent the
initial fraud and little to prevent subsequent frauds. Even upon a close reading,
many appellate decisions fail to provide adequate notice, as when an interpretation
of the statutory language is specifically geared to the facts at issue. A potential
offender must still determine what the circuit court might hold in the case at hand.
tion in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal
Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435 (1995); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail
Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1994); Ellen S.
Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223 (1992).
Trenchant critiques of other criminal statutes that are frequently used in white collar cases are also long-
standing. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959)
(conspiracy); Donald C. Langevoort, Rule lOb-5 As an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S-7 (1993)
(insider trading).
Commentators continue to critique the statutes. See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code"
Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes As a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 660-65 (2006); William
J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
12. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (emphasizing importance of minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement); Connolly v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating statute violates due
process if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application").
13. See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. 696, 706-07 (2005) (interpreting section
1512(b)(2)(B) to require proof that defendant was conscious of wrongdoing); see also Eric J. Tamashasky, The
Lewis Caroll Offense: The Ever-Changing Meaning of"Corruptly" Within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGIS.
129, 141-66 (2004).
14. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (stating that general statements of the law are
capable of giving fair and clear warning of criminality).
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Courts have little choice about interpreting undefined statutory terms, and they
inevitably arrive at different definitions. The result is that whether certain conduct
is a crime often depends on the circuit in which the case is tried. The paucity of
notice provided by the federal statutes is reflected in the general understanding that
the main issue in many white collar cases is whether the crime charged encom-
passes the defendant's conduct. Recent cases show that reasonable minds can differ
about the applicability of federal fraud statutes and illustrate some confusion of
prosecutors and judges about their scope." In sum, white collar criminal statutes
do not play a substantive role in deterring business executives from engaging in
prohibited conduct. In prohibiting everything, vague and broad criminal laws pro-
hibit nothing.
Community values, which the criminal law is expected to reflect, often provide
notice that proposed conduct is illegal. Do such values not help to provide notice in
corporate settings? One may also wonder why pre-Enron enforcement actions and
news reports did not deter criminal frauds. Answers may lie in a hallmark charac-
teristic of corporate crimes: they occur within institutional entities.
B. The Institutional Setting
In hindsight, it seems clear that personality characteristics and workplace values
may have obscured the limited notice provided by the substantive criminal law and
even consideration of harsh penalties for violating the law. 6 This observation does
not excuse or justify executive criminality, but may explain the failure of the law to
deter corporate agents from engaging in criminal conduct.
Research by psychologists and behavioral economists offers insights into the
ramifications of an institutional setting.'7 For instance, firms that value decisive and
aggressive managers may attract optimistic, over-confident, and risk-taking indi-
viduals with excessive self esteem. These characteristics can impair their capacity to
appreciate the possibility that a business decision may cross the line into illegality.'"
15. See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 91, 112
(2d Cir. 2002), rev'd 354 F.2d 124, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2003),
affd on reh'g en banc, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1997).
16. I have also considered the effect of the workplace setting on executives and employees in another
article. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based Criminal Liability for
Complicit Corporations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2007).
17. Scholars who studied actual, rather than assumed, behavior provided the initial insights. See, e.g.,
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Colin Camerer
& Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999);
Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON. 585 (1995); see
also MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME (1983).
18. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 983 (2005); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); Larry E. Rib-
stein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J.
CORP. L. 1 (2002).
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Another related explanation rests on the phenomenon of "group think." The corpo-
rate setting may create dynamics that impede independent assessments as individu-
als become inclined to support or at least not to question decisions of the group.
The duty of all employees to provide loyal services to an employer may also be a
factor. Employee loyalty is a legal obligation memorialized in common law deci-
sions that condemn disloyal conduct. 9 The obligation of loyalty, based on cultural
values, firm expectations, and legal doctrine, can lead an individual to place the
interests of the firm over those of investors. Finally, loyalty and a firm's ethos, or
character, might encourage managers to engage in questionable or criminal con-
duct.2" For instance, the competitive environment at Enron is said to have contrib-
uted to an unquestioning and aggressive workforce.2
Other psychological tendencies also resonate in a firm setting. John Darley has
identified an inclination to interpret complex rules so they favor the interpreter.22
When interpretive judgments are necessary, the tendency toward sympathetic inter-
pretation can lead to an "unnoticed transition into crime." As indicated by the
term, "transition," the tendency has long term effects, as the following example
illustrates. Executives acting on impulse or in response to a particular situation
sympathetically interpret an accounting convention, such as whether a transaction
is sufficiently complete to be counted as revenue in a particular quarter. A sympa-
thetic interpretation benefits the firm, allowing it to declare greater revenue and
meet analysts' expectations. Although this initial act, involving a bona-fide inter-
pretation made without an intent to defraud, is probably not in itself criminal, it
establishes a pattern of bending the rules that can lead to similar subsequent deci-
sions that grow more serious. The initial judgment begins a chain of similar inter-
pretations that may eventually cross the line into criminality.
Another explanation of crime within business settings has to do with the self-
conception of otherwise law-abiding executives, who view themselves as inherently
ethical. That self-conception is a barrier that prevents individuals from even per-
ceiving that a given situation may raise ethical considerations, that a decision has
19. Employee loyalty underpins an employee's duty of confidentiality, is crucial to trade secret doctrine,
and justifies the common-law duty not to compete. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2005) ("An
agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship."); see also Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States,
20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321 (1999); Michelle Jacobs, Loyalty's Reward-A Felony Conviction: Recent Prose-
cutions of High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 843 (2006).
20. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1095, 1123-27 (1991) (discussing existence of a corporation's "characteristic spirit").
21. See Moohr, An Enron Lesson, supra note 8, at 965-66. In the words of Professor Ribstein, the Enron
culture created business executives who were "Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically optimis-
tic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions." Ribstein, supra note 18, at 9. For a discussion of the aggressive
firm culture that led to abusive tax shelters at KPMG, see Evan Hoffman, Note, IRS Circular 230 and Profes-
sional Discipline for Firms, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1241, 1241-52 (2006).
22. John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison
Sentences, I.L. & PoL'Y 189, 199-200 (2005).
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an ethical component. In the words of researchers, the ethics fade from the decision
or dilemma.23 Fading may explain why an executive does not perceive a decision or
course of conduct to be criminal. For instance, an executive who discovers that
subordinates have altered financial statements may conceal the fraud in an effort to
avoid negative effects of disclosure and to gain time in which to correct inaccurate
statements. Failing to disclose the fraud was not intended to inflate earnings and
the executive may have acted to benefit investors because immediate disclosure
would lower the value of their investment.24 The ethical aspect of the decision, a
deception, has faded away from the total circumstances taken into consideration
before acting.
Over-confidence, biased judgment, group think, loyalty, unnoticed transitions,
and fading all explain, to one degree or another, why it is difficult to deter crime in
a business setting. Business employees may consider their actions to be lawful and,
at the least, are unlikely to consider that their actions are criminal. The business
setting, coupled with white collar statutes that fail to provide notice of what con-
duct is criminal, indicates why achieving deterrence and law-abiding business con-
duct in institutional settings is more difficult than anticipated. These
considerations also mitigate the deterrent effect of greater penalties for corporate
crime.
III. DETERRENCE FROM PENALTIES
Congress' first reaction to the emerging scandals of 2002 was to increase drastically
the penalties for common white collar crimes. 2 The new obstruction statutes,
which are substantially similar to existing provisions, authorize maximum
sentences of ten and twenty year terms, a 200% increase over previous maximum
penalties. 26 The maximum sentence for mail and wire fraud, often implicated in
business crimes, was increased from five to twenty years, a 400% increase.27 The
new insider trading statute authorizes a maximum term of twenty-five years, a
250% increase over maximum punishment for violating the existing statutes.28
23. See id. at 200 (citing Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading and the Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 223 (2004)).
24. The scenario is adapted from United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge
Rakoff suggested that, under the common law, the executive was an accessory after the fact and would be less
deserving of punishment than the instigator of the fraud. Id. at 513.
25. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Moohr, An Enron Lesson, supra note 8, at 952-55 (evaluating criminal
provisions). Congress' reaction reflects a twenty-five year legislative trend to increase prison terms. See Joshua
Dressier, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 855 (2005)
(stating that lawmakers employ the principle of "What do I need to get re-elected?").
26. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2005) with 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2001).
27. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2003) with the same provisions in the 2000 version of the
code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2000).
28. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002) with 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1998).
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Statutory maximum penalties tell only one part of the sentencing story in the
federal system; actual penalties have been determined according to the Sentencing
Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, the most significant determinant of sentences for
financial crimes like fraud is the amount of money lost by victims, which is cali-
brated in the Guidelines' loss table.29 Put simply, the prison sentence varies with the
financial losses of the victims. In addition, the Guidelines authorize additional
prison time if the crime required the use of sophisticated means or special skill,3" if
there was a large number of victims,3 or if the defendant played a leadership role in
the crime. When a publicly-traded company was involved, additional time is ad-
ded if the defendant was an officer or if the crime endangered the company's finan-
cial security.33 These factors are almost invariably present in corporate offenses, and
the combination of these factors, high maximum sentences, and the Guidelines'
loss table makes penalties for corporate offenses substantial. 4
Notwithstanding Congress' impulse to increase sentences for white collar of-
fenses, research indicates that increasing penalties may not increase deterrence and
may be unnecessary. A review of several studies indicates that, in general, increas-
ing the duration of a prison sentence for a type of crime will not result in a de-
crease in the rate of that crime.36 The studies, based on naturally occurring
experiments that compare outcomes when one state increases the penalty of an
offense and another state does not, indicate that "there are no general demonstra-
tions of crime rate reductions achieved by alterations in sentence severity."37 Fi-
nally, the propensity of human beings to discount future rewards or punishments
29. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Bi.1 (2005).
30. Id. §§ 2Bi.i(b)(8)(c), 3B1.3.
31. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
32. Id. § 3Bi.l(a).
33. Id. §§ 2B1.i(b)(15)(A)(i), 2Bi.i(b)(13)(B)(ii).
34. Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), courts have
more discretion to deviate from a Guideline sentence. Nevertheless, prosecutors may still press for harsh
sentences on the ground that the high maximum penalties for corporate crimes indicate that Congress consid-
ered fraudulent conduct within business firms to be very serious.
35. Research results reported by Paul Robinson, John Darley, Tom Tyler and their associates are particu-
larly apt. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME 492 (1995), TOM
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J.
949 (2003) [hereinafter The Role of Deterrence]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
36. See Darley, supra note 22, at 194-95 (citing Anthony Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity
and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143, 143-95
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003)).
37. Id. at 195. Other studies compare the incidence of crimes before and after a jurisdiction increased
penalties. Id. at 194.
VOL. 2 NO. 1 2007
ON THE PROSPECTS OF DETERRING CORPORATE CRIME
makes it even less likely that long prison terms, on their own, will deter others from
committing crimes. 8
Despite these research results, which are not specific to white collar crimes, one
could reasonably suppose that a white collar offender might consider the possibility
of punishment. White collar crimes are usually not a matter of passion or rage, nor
are offenders under the influence of drugs or alcohol when they engage in fraudu-
lent conduct. Fraud and conspiracy typically require planning and some subter-
fuge, offering an opportunity to consider the prospect of punishment. But whether
potential harsh penalties influence individuals who operate within institutional
business settings is far from certain. 9 Institutional barriers that undermine the de-
terrent effect of the substantive law also undermine the deterrent effect of harsh
penalties. Because of biased judgments, group think, loyalty, and psychological ten-
dencies like unnoticed transitions and fading, individuals who work in a business
firm are not likely to consider the possibility that their conduct may be regarded as
criminal. If that is so, they never consider possible penalties. Finally, lengthy prison
terms may be unnecessary in the white collar world: if potential wrongdoers recog-
nize a risk of penalties, even relatively short prison sentences are likely to act as a
strong deterrent. °
It appears that in order to reduce crime through increased sentences, prison
terms would have to exceed the limits considered "plausible" in western societies.4
Plausible limits were exceeded in a recent case that implicated both maximum
sentences and the Guidelines. Richard Adelson, once the president of a firm that
specialized in cancer diagnosis testing, was convicted of conspiracy, securities
fraud, and three false filing counts.42 Adelson discovered a fraud begun by subordi-
nates under the former chief executive officer, but rather than expose the scheme,
Adelson concealed and participated in its continuation.43 Based on a calculation of
$260 million total shareholder loss and various adjustments, the recommended
Guideline sentence was 85 years.44 Characterizing the sentence as extraordinary and
38. See id. at 200-01 (citing Marjon van der Pol & John Cairns, A Comparison of the Discounted Utility
Model and Hyperbolic Discounting Models in the Case of Social and Private Intertemporal Preferences for Health,
49 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 79, 93 (2002)).
39. Not all white collar crimes occur within an institutional setting and the existing studies of white collar
penalties do not differentiate between institutional and non-institutional crimes. These studies suggest only
weak support for the position that general deterrence is furthered by criminal penalties. See Elizabeth Szockyj,
Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 493-94 (1999). For that matter, there is little
empirical support that harsh penalties deter conventional street crimes as compared to certainty of the sanc-
tion. Id. at 493.
40. See Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005); Szockyj, supra note 39, at 492.
41. See Darley, supra note 22, at 195; see also Robinson & Darley, The Role of Deterrence, supra note 35, at
995.
42. See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 509-11. The government calculated that an 88% decline in share price caused the firm's share-
holders to suffer a combined loss of more than $260 million. Id. The Guideline loss table authorized a 55-year
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"patently unreasonable,"4" Judge Rakoff departed from the Guideline Sentence to
impose a sentence of three and a half years, based on federal sentencing goals of
retribution and general deterrence. 6 Even more tellingly, the prosecutors who had
tried the case suggested a departure from the Guideline sentence, albeit obliquely.4"
Evidence indicates that the general public shares a "plausibility limit" on sentenc-
ing. Experimental studies indicate that citizens evaluate sentences according to the
immorality of the conduct and react negatively to sentences that they consider too
strict.4" To a lesser extent, citizens consider incapacitation, but do not entertain the
notion of general deterrence.49 In a word, draconian prison terms fail the "plausibil-
ity test" because they offend community values. Harsh sentences may also run afoul
of deterrence doctrine in a very basic way. At some point, the undeterminable
benefit of deterrence may not offset the financial costs born by the community
(including lost productivity of the defendant) and others. The over-breadth and
vagueness of the criminal statutes contribute to unease, especially when long
sentences are given for conduct that is not adequately defined in the code. Given
these considerations, the promise of deterring potential wrongdoers through en-
forcement is particularly alluring.
IV. DETERRENCE FROM ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement of criminal laws, which heightens the risk of apprehension and the
possibility of punishment, promises to deter people from engaging in criminal con-
duct. Enforcement also reinforces community norms and the internalized moral
codes of individuals. When enforcement is fair and even-handed, it expresses two
community values: the condemnation of criminal acts and a preference for fair
procedures. Another positive effect of increased enforcement is that it is fairer than
sporadic enforcement coupled with high penalties. In the latter plan, which costs
less, the convicted are given long prison terms and serve as stark examples of the
consequences of unlawful acts, while equally culpable wrongdoers go free. In-
creased enforcement that convicts more wrongdoers and delivers shorter sentences
may obtain the same deterrent effect more fairly. For all these reasons, the current
enforcement initiative against corporate crime holds significant promise.
The unprecedented scope of current enforcement efforts is indicated by the
number of business people that have been charged. Approximately 315 former em-
sentence based on this loss. Additional time was added by upward enhancements for using a special skill,
assuming a leadership role, and harm to a publicly traded company. Id. at 510-11.
45. Id. at 506.
46. Id. at 514 (utilizing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
47. Id. at 511 (presenting sentencing colloquy).
48. See Darley, supra note 22, at 206-07 (citing several studies by Carlsmith and Darley and citing public
reaction to specific three strike sentences in California).
49. See id.
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ployees and officers of business entities have been indicted since March 2002.0 As
of December 2005, prosecutors had secured 161 convictions, 140 of them through
guilty pleas."' New laws and initiatives, like protecting whistle blowers from retalia-
tion and imposing duties on inside counsel, promise to increase enforcement pres-
sure by encouraging the reporting of questionable conduct.1
2
The numbers are impressive because prosecutors dealing with corporate crime
face a dual problem: lack of information about questionable practices and lack of
evidence of illegal conduct. It may be difficult to identify and understand a prob-
lematic business transaction or judgment, and there may be little or only indirect
evidence of executive involvement in that transaction. Cooperation from witnesses
can be crucial in solving both problems. Consequently, and as the figures indicate,
obtaining plea bargains is a key strategy in the current enforcement effort. Prosecu-
tors are aided in this effort by their control of whether and what to charge, as well
as by their influence at sentencing.53 Further, pleas are conditioned on cooperation
agreements that obligate defendants to provide information and to testify for the
government.5" The strategy is to focus first on lower and mid-level executives who
can provide information about transactions, decisions, and evidence that impli-
cates higher-level individuals. The Enron case against Ken Lay provides a text-book
example: information gathered from two mid-level executives led prosecutors to
the Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, who in turn led prosecutors to the
three top Enron officials, including CEO Ken Lay.55
Despite the contribution of such tactics to successful prosecutions, the practices
raise significant concerns. The prospect of very long prison sentences raises the
haunting possibility that an innocent person may decide, quite reasonably, to plead
50. See Brickey, Major Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, supra note 3. By another account, 1,000 individuals
have been convicted of white collar offenses since 2001, including 167 officers. See Edward Iwata, Debate Heats
up on Justice's Deferred-Prosecution Deals, USA TODAY, May 31, 2006, at 4B.
51. See Brickey, Major Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, supra note 3. The percentage of plea bargained dispo-
sitions in the current corporate crime cases is below the average of 95% in the federal criminal justice system,
although the figure could increase as more cases near trial, particularly if co-defendants decide to plead. See
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). The
practice of plea bargaining is well-entrenched in federal and state systems, largely because it is seen as an
efficient method of disposing of cases. Offenders exchange the right to trial and other due process rights for
certainty and a lower sentence, and the government obtains a conviction at a fraction of the cost of trial.
52. But see Bucy, supra note 1, at 315-17 (explaining why recent reforms are unlikely to be effective); Jill E.
Fisch & Ken Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003).
53. In addition to deciding what crimes to charge, which influences the penalty, prosecutors may recom-
mend a downward departure from a Guideline Sentence when an offender provides substantial aid to the
government. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2005).
54. See Brickey, In Enron's Wake, supra note 3, at 373-75 (discussing significance of cooperation
agreements).
55. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White
Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 184-85 & n.80 (2004) (recounting
prosecutorial effort to secure plea of Andrew Fastow, which included charging and agreeing to a plea bargain
with Lea Fastow, his wife and former Enron assistant treasurer).
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guilty rather than risk a double-digit sentence. 6 Plea bargains also introduce unde-
sirable variability in sentencing into a deterrent system. A plea-bargained sentence
is, almost by definition, lower than a possible sentence based on the original indict-
ment,57 and may also be significantly lower than those of similarly-situated defend-
ants who went to trial-even when the individuals were involved in the same
fraudulent scheme. The Adelson case, mentioned earlier, illustrates the variance.
In Adelson, the scheme to defraud had actually begun under a former CEO."8
The government accepted her plea to misappropriating company funds for per-
sonal expenses, and she received a three month term of imprisonment. This con-
trasts starkly with the eighty-five year sentence recommended for Adelson. 9
Similarly, Jamie Olis, a Dynegy accounting executive convicted of various offenses
for an accounting fraud, was initially sentenced to twenty-four years in prison,
based on a $100 million loss calculation.6" Olis' boss, who had approved and partic-
ipated in the fraudulent accounting tactic, pleaded guilty, testified for the govern-
ment, and received a five-year term of imprisonment.6 The sentences shock twice;
once because of their length and again because of their disparity. But similar dis-
parities exist even when sentences are low. Martha Stewart, convicted of commit-
ting obstruction and false statement offenses, was sentenced to a ten month
penalty, split between five months in prison and five months under house arrest.62
Faneuil, the assistant broker who handled the transaction that led to the investiga-
tion, admittedly thought the trade was illegal and for six months participated in
Stewart's attempt to provide lawful reasons for the transaction.63 In return for his
56. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that because of possible long
prison terms "[elven the threat of indictment on wafer-thin evidence of fraud may therefore compel a plea").
57. For instance, Fastow was charged with 109 counts and pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy,
agreeing to serve ten years in person. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Fastow, No. H-2-02-0665
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2003). Fastow was ultimately sentenced to a six-year term based on his cooperation with
prosecutors and civil plaintiffs. See Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionueva, Fastow Sentenced to Six Years, N.Y.
TiMES, Sept. 27, 2006 at Cl.
58. See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
59. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
60. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 2005).
61. See id. at 542-43 (following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (vacating sentence and re-
manding for resentencing). Another colleague who had also participated in the accounting scheme was simi-
larly sentenced, upon a plea and cooperation agreement, to five years. Id. at 542. Upon resentencing, Olis
received a six-year term of imprisonment. See United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-02, 2006 WL 2716048, at *13
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
The WorldCom matter provides another example. Bernie Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years in prison;
Scott Sullivan, who admittedly participated in the fraud, pleaded and testified against Ebbers and received a five
year prison term. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 117, 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2006). In upholding the
sentence, the court noted that other defendants in the case had cooperated with prosecutors and that Ebbers, as
CEO, had primary responsibility for the fraud. Id. at 129. This justification seems to ignore that Sullivan, as
CFO, also shared significant responsibility for the fraud.
62. See United Stated v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 2006).
63. See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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testimony against Stewart and her co-defendant, however, Faneuil was allowed to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge and ultimately paid a $2,000 criminal fine.64
These examples are not offered as argument for absolute parity in sentencing; it
is preferable that sentencing judges take into account factors that may lead to dif-
ferent sentences. Traditional individualized sentencing and the Guideline policy of
real offense sentencing inevitably result in some inconsistency between the
sentences of similarly-situated offenders. Despite those values, inconsistent
sentences because of plea and cooperation agreements merit attention. In the first
instance, long and inconsistent prison terms do not easily satisfy retributive goals,
especially when the financial harm that was caused by the defendant's breach of
moral conduct is essentially indeterminate.6" In the second instance, it is hard to
square inconsistent sentences with the deterrent rationale that justifies high maxi-
mums because grossly inconsistent sentences undercut the threat of those maxi-
mums. Not only do variable sentences introduce an undesirable uncertainty, but
they also make sentencing seem random instead of principled. The possibility of
random, unprincipled, and low sentences makes it less likely that potential penal-
ties will deter potential offenders. Inconsistent sentences also dull the expressive
message that a conviction sends to the greater community and to the business
world. Unusually low sentences that contrast with longer sentences for the same
conduct communicate that the bargainer's conduct was not a serious violation of
community standards.
In addition to working from the bottom up, by pressuring mid-level employees
to incriminate high-level managers, prosecutors are also working from the top
down by pressuring firms to incriminate managers and employees. As we learned
from David Anders, a former white-collar prosecutor, firms that want to avoid
criminal charges are expected to aid prosecutors in convicting their former
employees.66
Firms are highly motivated to avoid indictment. The federal standard for con-
victing a corporation of a crime committed by an agent is, as noted earlier, not
rigorous, and the Arthur Andersen prosecution makes the negative effects of indict-
ment, trial, and conviction very real. Firms understandably seek to avoid collateral
64. See United States v. Faneuil, 02-CR-1287 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2002) (Misdemeanor Information charging
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 830 for withholding information from authorities); Brooke A. Masters, Witness in
Stewart Trial Is Spared Prison Time, WASH. POST, July 24, 2004, at El.
65. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining perils of estimating
investor loss); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (outlining three methods
of estimating investor loss). In Adelson, a financial expert identified other marketplace factors that made it
impossible to determine what portion of the actual loss had been caused by the fraudulent conduct. Id. at
509-10.
66. See Larry Ribstein, A Former Prosecutor Shares His Secrets, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/
2006/04aformer-prose.html (Apr. 21, 2006, 20:27 EST) (quoting remarks of former prosecutor David
Anders).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
GERALDINE SZOTT MOOHR
consequences that follow indictment, such as a fall in share value and loss of cli-
ents, in addition to the penalties that accompany a conviction.
Under DOJ policies, firms may negotiate agreements under which prosecutors
agree not to file charges or not to prosecute filed charges as long as the firm abides
by the terms of the agreement.67 To secure this outcome, firms had to cooperate
with the investigation.68 One way to cooperate was to dismiss those executives and
employees who were involved in the alleged illegal conduct. Cooperation has also
been demonstrated by voluntarily waiving attorney-client and work product privi-
leges and disclosing the results of internal investigations, other memos, and finan-
cial documents. Such disclosure identifies and may often implicate individuals who
participated in the matter, perhaps unfairly. Prosecutors also considered whether a
firm intended to pay the legal expenses of former executives, an obligation that may
be a matter of contract, firm policy, and even state law.69 Faced with disclosure of
privileged documents and without funds for legal representation, a former execu-
tive was effectively trapped between the interests of the firm and those of the
prosecutor.
The practice of deferring corporate prosecutions and the terms of individual
agreements were met with forceful and sustained criticism.7 ° A federal judge held
that government pressure on firms to withdraw payment of attorney's fees violated
defendants' constitutional rights,71 Congress threatened legislation,72 the Sentencing
Commission dropped Guideline language that encouraged waiver,73 and former at-
torneys general issued a public letter that decried DOJ policy.74
67. See generally Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN.
& COM. L. 45, 55-56 (2006) (describing agreements); see also Edward Iwata, Debate Heats Up on Justice's
Deferred-Prosecution Deals, USA TODAY, May 31, 2006, at 4B (reporting prosecutors have signed a "couple
dozen" agreements in the past four years, twice as many as in the previous ten years); Andy Pasztor, Boeing to
Settle Federal Probes for $615 Million, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at Al.
68. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson to Heads of Department Components
and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), re-
printed in UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, tit. 9, CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL, 161-62, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
69. See Stephen W. Grafman & William F. Boyer, KPMG Ruling Is Right and Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14,
2006 (noting obligation to pay employees' attorneys' fees).
70. See JOHN HASNAS, TRAPPED: WHEN ACTING ETHICALLY IS AGAINST THE LAW (2006); William S.
Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IowA. L. REV. 643 (2002); Orland,
supra note 67; see also Kathryn Kennealy, The KPMG Deferred Prosecution: Warning Flags for Defense Rights, 29
Nov. CHAMPION 44 (2005) (outlining the one-sided agreement signed by KPMG); Stephanie Martz, Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 Nov. CHAMPION 44 (2005); Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred
and Non Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. 1-3, Dec. 28, 2005 (noting failure to indict firms).
71. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
72. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006).
73. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 28063 (May 18, 2006), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/2006guid/FinalUserFrdly.pdf; Lynnley Browning, Judges Press Companies That Cut Off Legal Fees,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at Cl.
74. See Griffin B. Bell, et al., Letter re Proposed Revisions to Department of Justice Policy Regarding
Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, (Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author). The
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In December 2006, the DOJ adjusted its controversial policy.7" The revised policy
provides procedural protection on the waiver issue, but most of the prosecutorial
guidelines are unchanged, and the government is free to consider all forms of vol-
untary cooperation. It remains to be seen whether the adjusted policy will unwind
the unwritten understanding that has developed between prosecutors and corpo-
rate counsel that the best corporate response is to implicate executives and employ-
ees. That response, although entirely rational from the corporate viewpoint, may
interfere with effective deterrence of individuals and firms. Executives may fail to
consult with firm counsel before undertaking innovative or risky transactions. The
shift of responsibility from the entity to managers and employees, in the long run,
may reduce the firm's incentive to monitor employees.76
Other prosecutorial policies, such as using cover-up offenses, lodging multiple
charges based on the same course of conduct, and conditioning pleas on coopera-
tion agreements, may also undercut effective deterrence. 7 As mentioned, courts are
showing some unease with harsh Guideline sentences that are based on shareholder
losses.7" The Supreme Court rejected the government's expansive interpretation of
the mens rea for obstruction, on which the conviction of Arthur Andersen was
based,79 and a Fifth Circuit decision has raised, once again, debate over the vague-
ness of the honest service provision in the mail and wire fraud statutes.80 The mul-
tiple critiques indicate that the prosecutorial enforcement effort may have reached
a turning point and become overly aggressive.
On the whole, the aggressive enforcement policy, which includes plea and coop-
eration agreements, inconsistent sentences, deferred prosecutions of firms, and
other tactics, may have swung too far. In today's harshly punitive environment, it is
surprising to consider that in 1992 the DOJ rejected a definition of white-collar
letter was signed by former attorneys general Bell, Gerson, Thornburgh, former deputy attorneys general
Dinkins, Gorelick, Terwilliger, and former solicitors general, Dellinger, Olson, Starr, and Waxman. Id.
75. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty to United States Attorneys, Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
76. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 521, 534-36 (2004) (discussing the dynamic that allows corporate entities to avoid
prosecution); Laufer, supra note 70.
77. See Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEo. L.J. 1135, 1164-65 (2004); Dale A. Oesterle, Early
Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash
with Donaldson over Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443 (2004); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628-30 (2005); Michael L. Seigel & Chris-
topher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1107, 1125-28 (2005).
78. See supra note 42-48 and accompanying text; supra note 65.
79. See Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005); see also United States v. Quat-
trone, 441 F.3d 153, 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2006) (relying on Andersen to vacate guilty verdict).
80. See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing wire fraud convictions of four
Merrill Lynch executives implicated in the unlawful Nigerian barge transaction between Merrill Lynch and
Enron).
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crime that focused on the white-collar status of the offender. The DOJ explained
that the offender-based definition "implicitly raises the specter of large enforcement
agencies targeting whole segments of society for special enforcement emphasis."'"
Today, only fourteen years after Benjamin Civiletti offered this assessment, the gov-
ernment has embraced a policy of targeting corporate officers and employees for
special enforcement emphasis. The consequence, whether the target is the mafia,
drug dealers, or corporate executives, is a tendency to demonize individuals be-
cause they are members of a group. s2 We know from experience that the long-term
effects of such characterizations can negatively affect other social goals. In the case
of corporate offenses, it is also counter-productive because we must, in the end,
rely on members of the business community to encourage law-abiding conduct.
Convicting those caught in this period of transition and imposing harsh sentences
on some of them may not strike members of the greater community or the business
world as entirely fair. It seems foolish and counter-productive to alienate the very
people on whom we rely to enforce lawful business practices by exerting informal
pressure on their firms and colleagues.
V. CONCLUSION
Relying on the criminal law to prevent corporate crimes is more complicated and
less effective than legislators, regulators, and enforcers believe. The most effective
use of criminal law in deterring corporate crime requires legislators to amend the
substantive laws so they provide clear notice of prohibited conduct, to avoid the
reflexive impulse to increase penalties, and to review DOJ enforcement policies.
The likelihood of effectively deterring crime at corporate entities is greatest when
the substantive law, penalties, and enforcement policies take into account the insti-
tutional setting in which corporate crime occurs.
81. See Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization of a Con-
cept, 17 CRIME, L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 235, 242 (1992) (quoted in JULIE O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR
CRIMES: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 2003)).
82. A recent survey of television dramas adds substance to this abstract concern. Negative plots about
business executives outweighed positive plots by four to one, and victims were 21 times as likely to be kid-
napped or murdered at the hands of businessman than by a member of the mob. See On TV, There's a Killer
Corporate Image Problem, WASH. POST, June 23, 2006, at D1.
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